Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond by William

Description: FREE SHIPPING UK WIDE Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond by William Thomson Building on the pioneering work by the Nobel Memorial Laureate, John Nash, Professor Thomson has brought together a broad selection of seminal articles which analyse and discuss bargaining and the theory of cooperative games. FORMAT Hardcover LANGUAGE English CONDITION Brand New Publisher Description Building on the pioneering work by the Nobel Memorial Laureate, John Nash, Professor Thomson has brought together a broad selection of seminal articles which analyse and discuss bargaining and the theory of cooperative games. Beginning with a distinguished collection of papers discussing the origins of game theory, this volume systematically explores its development as a tool to illuminate economic behaviour. It includes the work of highly accomplished academics whose discoveries over the years have shaped the direction of this subject. With his insightful introduction, the editor has ensured that this indispensable book is suitable for anyone with an interest in cooperative gaming. Author Biography Edited by William Thomson, Elmer B. Milliman Professor of Economics, University of Rochester, US Table of Contents Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction William ThomsonPART IBASIC PAPERSAIndependence1. John F. Nash Jr. (1950), The Bargaining Problem2. Alvin E. Roth (1977), Individual Rationality and Nashs Solution to the Bargaining Problem3. Alvin E. Roth (1977), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nashs Bargaining Problem4. Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences5. Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions6. Efe A. Ok (1998), Inequality Averse Collective ChoiceBMonotonicity7. Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), Other Solutions to Nashs Bargaining Problem8. A.E. Roth (1979), An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games9. Ehud Kalai (1977), Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons10. Haruo Imai (1983), Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution11. W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), Monotonicity and Independence Axioms12. P.L. Yu (1973), A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems13. Youngsub Chun (1988), The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining ProblemsCAxioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Feasible Sets14. Roger B. Myerson (1977), Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility15. M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game16. Roger B. Myerson (1981), Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems17. Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions18. Hans Peters (1986), Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in BargainingDOrdinal Invariance19. Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games20. Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining21. Yves Sprumont (2000), A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces22. Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many PlayersENon-convex Problems23. John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinksy Solutions24. Lin Zhou (1997), The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex ProblemsPART IIUNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE DISAGREEMENT POINTAMonotonocity25. William Thomson (1987), Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement PointBAxioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Disagreement Points26. Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms27. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement PointsPART IIIVARIABLE POPULATION OF AGENTSAPopulation Monotonicity28. William Thomson (1983), The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population29. William Thomson (1983), Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution30. William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair DivisionBConsistency and Its Converse31. Terje Lensberg (1987), Stability and Collective Rationality32. Terje Lensberg (1988), Stability and the Nash Solution33. Youngsub Chun (2002), The Converse Consistency Principle in BargainingPART IVENRICHING THE MODELAAdding Information About Underlying Set of Physical Alternatives34. Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nashs Bargaining Problem35. Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), Risk Aversion and Nashs Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes36. Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points37. John E. Roemer (1988), Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments38. Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences39. Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis40. Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining TheoryBAdding Claims41. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), Bargaining Problems with Claims42. Walter Bossert (1993), An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with ClaimsCAdding Preferences Over Solutions43. Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining ProblemPART VSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONSAAnalyzing Bargaining Problems as Strategic Games44. John Nash (1953), Two-Person Cooperative Games45. Eric van Damme (1986), The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal46. Ariel Rubinstein (1982), Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelBManipulation47. Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), Distortion of Preferences and The Nash Theory of Bargaining48. Joel Sobel (1981), Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining ProblemCImplementation49. H. Moulin (1984), Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution50. Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining SolutionsPART VIEXPERIMENTS51. M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), On Dividing Justly Details ISBN1848441673 Pages 784 Publisher Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd ISBN-10 1848441673 ISBN-13 9781848441675 Publication Date 2010-10-29 Short Title BARGAINING & THE THEORY OF COO Language English Media Book Format Hardcover Illustrations Yes Year 2010 Subtitle John Nash and Beyond Imprint Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Place of Publication Cheltenham Country of Publication United Kingdom AU Release Date 2010-10-29 NZ Release Date 2010-10-29 UK Release Date 2010-10-29 Author William Thomson Series Elgar Mini Series Edited by William Thomson DEWEY 330.015193 Audience Professional & Vocational We've got this At The Nile, if you're looking for it, we've got it. With fast shipping, low prices, friendly service and well over a million items - you're bound to find what you want, at a price you'll love! 30 DAY RETURN POLICY No questions asked, 30 day returns! FREE DELIVERY No matter where you are in the UK, delivery is free. 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